


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Total Force Policy Interim Report to the Congress

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Department of Defense
September 1990





THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 SEP 1990

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the interim report made by the Total Force Policy Study Group is hereby submitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 1101(d)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189).

Sincerely,

F. Tapparo



cc: The Honorable John Warner
Ranking Republican

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 SEP 1990

**The Honorable Les Aspin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515**

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the interim report made by the Total Force Policy Study Group is hereby submitted in accordance with the provisions of Section 1101(d)(1) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "D J Atwood", is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

**The Honorable Bill Dickinson
Ranking Republican**

INTERIM REPORT

OF THE

TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP


September 14, 1990

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FOREWORD

In accordance with section 1101 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, the Department of Defense (DoD) is reviewing its Total Force Policy, active-reserve force mix, and military force structure. As required by the Authorization Act, the review is giving special emphasis to the operation, effectiveness, and soundness of the Total Force Policy; the assignment of missions within and between the active and reserve components; and the structure of U.S. active and reserve forces.

The Total Force study complements the regular reviews of force structure issues conducted by the Department as part of its planning, programming, and budgeting process. The Study Group has considered assumptions about the use of reserve forces, and an array of other issues related to the Total Force. The recently initiated Operation DESERT SHIELD in and around the Arabian Peninsula is now testing many of these assumptions and may provide insights useful in reviewing the policy. The Study Group plans to include lessons learned from the DESERT SHIELD operation in its final report, due this December.



This interim report describes the ongoing work of the Study Group, with special focus on the implementation of the Total Force Policy in the Southwest Asian crisis through August 31. The report is divided into four sections. Section I reviews the objectives of the Total Force Policy and describes some implications of the changing strategic environment for the policy. Section II summarizes the activities of the Study Group to date. Section III provides data and commentary on the use of some elements of the Total Force in the current Southwest Asian operations. Section IV offers some concluding observations about the application of the study in budget development.

I. INTRODUCTION

The military capability of the United States has never resided entirely in the active component. We have always depended on reserve forces and our mobilization base to maintain, in peacetime, capabilities that would be required in war. After World War II, but before the 1970s, active forces were used to maintain forward deployments, to provide the first echelon of forces for a war in Central Europe against the Warsaw Pact, and to respond to regional contingencies. In the 1950s, members of the reserve components generally were used as individual "fillers," although the Army National Guard deployed by unit as reinforcements. After the mid-1960s, both Reserve and National Guard forces were seen as the second echelon of combat forces for a war in Central Europe. At the same time, they assumed important support roles in the overall military structure.

The "Total Force" concept was first articulated by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, and adopted as formal DoD policy by Secretary James Schlesinger in 1973. The Total Force Policy was never intended to make full-time active soldiers and part-time reservists mirror images of each other. Rather, it was a creative

response to meeting the nation's post-World War II responsibilities as a global power and the fiscal and demographic realities facing the Defense Department after the Vietnam war. As a general proposition, the policy has two principal tenets: to plan for the integrated use of all forces that are available--active, reserve, civilian, and allied (including host nation support)--and to use reserve forces as the primary augmentation for active forces. Since its inception in 1973, the Total Force Policy has been a great success. There has been unprecedented integration of purpose and capability between the active and reserve components, as well as improved utilization of the DoD civilian, contractor, and host nation support communities.

The specific objective of the Total Force Policy is to provide maximum military capability within fiscal constraints by integrating the capabilities and strengths of active and reserve units in the most cost-effective manner. The effect of this policy has been to place a substantial portion of our total military force in the reserves, with these components performing demanding wartime missions and fulfilling critical peacetime responsibilities.

Strategic Environment

The focus of U.S. national strategy has shifted over the past year in response to the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As the Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe has receded, the potential for smaller-scale, but demanding, contingencies in regions throughout the world has become an increasing concern.

In this changed environment, forward presence remains a key element of U.S. strategy. Forces for forward presence provide an impetus for continuation of the favorable changes in the international environment: they help preserve stability in Europe and other regions that are undergoing political and military evolutions, and they provide an initial basis for U.S. responses to crises and contingencies.

Crisis response capabilities will loom increasingly large in our military strategy. Regional conflicts and crises--often erupting with very little warning--are the most likely future threats we will face. To retain the ability to react to such threats in the uncertain times ahead will require continued dependence on strong--though reduced--active and reserve forces. These forces will differ in important ways from those the nation has maintained in the past. They will be

smaller, and their manning levels and readiness will be reduced in some cases. To respond to shorter-warning regional threats, our forces must emphasize--more than ever before--flexibility, versatility, global deployability, and rapid responsiveness. Readiness must remain the highest priority for those forces designated to respond to short-warning conflicts. Forces that provide rapid crisis response capabilities must be predominately in the active component, but reserve units will retain major crisis response roles.

In our restructured forces, reserve forces will be important, but in new ways. The need to be prepared for a massive, short-warning mobilization for a major conflict with the Warsaw Pact has diminished. We should now adjust the size, structure, and readiness of our active and reserve forces to help us deal with the more likely challenges we will face. Policies to meet these threats will have major implications for the size, structure, organization, readiness, and mix of our standing forces.

For the less likely but largest force-driving threats we face--a European theater conflict or a major global war--we can plan on much longer warning times. Therefore, we also are incorporating into our strategic planning the concept of reconstitution of forces. On the subject of warning time and reconstitution capabilities, President

Bush stated in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990: "By the mid-90s, the time it would take the Soviets to return to the levels of confrontation that marked the depths of the Cold War will be sufficient to allow us to rely not solely on existing forces--but to generate wholly new forces." This strategic shift means we can plan for substantial reductions over time in the size of the Total Force.

As we make these reductions, however, we must attend to future uncertainties by preserving a capability to reconstitute forces, should unexpected future circumstances require us to increase once again the active and reserve force structure in ways tailored to the threats that emerge. We must preserve, or prepare to rejuvenate, long-lead-time elements of the force structure, including sophisticated equipment and the invaluable resource represented by our skilled leaders and technicians. Therefore, we are developing strategies to retain the capabilities of highly trained personnel so that we can exploit their expertise if they are once again needed. Planning for reconstitution instead of retaining some forces also allows us to reallocate resources for the long-lead innovations that will guard against longer-term future threats.

Our future forces must be something more than merely a scaled-back or shrunken version of the forces we possess today. In his

Aspen speech, the President noted that if we simply cut force structure equally across the board, we may find ourselves without the forces we need for the new security environment. In the President's words, what we must aim for "are not merely reductions--but restructuring." As we plan for the future, we start with a major asset--the exceptionally high quality of our active and reserve components. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently described our forces as "the finest peacetime military in the history of America."

Force-Mix Considerations

Consistent with the reduced need for large forces on short notice, and with equipment available from restructuring, moving forces into the reserve components or preparing to reconstitute them may become attractive options because of the cost savings such steps could generate. However, the loss of immediate capability, readiness, and flexibility that in many cases would accompany such adjustments must be carefully weighed. Weighing these cost-effectiveness trade-offs is an essential consideration when making force-mix decisions.

Reserve forces are generally less expensive than comparable active forces, although the precise magnitude of the cost differential

varies according to the manning level, mission, and operating tempo of the unit in question. Reserve ground units, for example, are considerably less costly than active ground units. While still offering significant savings, some flying units in the Air National Guard, Air Reserve, and Naval Reserve are closer in cost to their active counterparts. Current manning and operating policies for Naval Reserve Force ships (60 percent active and 40 percent reserve crew ratios) minimize the cost difference between similar active and reserve frigates.

In considering the most appropriate force mix, we must focus on the need for forces to (1) provide peacetime presence, (2) maintain rapid crisis response capabilities, and (3) hedge against a need to reconstitute forces.

Peacetime presence is provided by forward-deployed forces. These forces generally are in the active component and require a rotation base (a pool of active-duty personnel to rotate to duty abroad) to permit members of deployed units to shift from overseas assignments to stateside duty. The need to maintain a forward presence in some regions has not diminished, although in certain areas, deployments could perhaps be reduced or conducted on an intermittent basis, perhaps using both active and reserve units. The

national security and operational costs of maintaining intermittent deployments would have to be weighed carefully, however, before such an approach were implemented.

Whether to place early-deploying combat capability for crisis response in the reserve components depends principally on the immediate readiness of the reserve units involved, the probability that they would be available when needed, and the desirability of having the execution of more of our strategy dependent on reserve availability. Because reserve units often include personnel with significant prior active-duty experience, their capabilities can be comparable to those of active units with similar missions. Some reserve units are less ready as a result of insufficient resources, management problems involving mismatches between individual military skills and unit requirements, and the difficulties of collective training (which are exacerbated for the reserves by the limited time available for peacetime training).

Reserve readiness for ground forces tends to be better in smaller units; most large reserve units--battalions, brigades, divisions--need additional training before employment in combat. The air reserve components, by contrast, often match their active counterparts in capability and are typically ready to deploy on short notice, in part

because of the high individual skill level of many air reservists who have prior active-duty service and are backed by sizable numbers of full-time personnel.

War-fighting capability should be placed in the reserve components only to the extent that units can, and will, be called up and mission-ready by the time they are deployed. Reserve participation in operational missions can be secured in one of three ways: (1) through reservists' volunteering for active duty; (2) through a call-up by the President; or (3) through declaration of a partial, full, or total mobilization (which requires the approval of Congress). The President has authority under Title 10 U.S.C. 673b to call up as many as 200,000 reservists for a 90-day period, with a possible extension for an additional 90 days. The section 673b authority had never been exercised prior to Operation DESERT SHIELD. For previous, smaller-scale operational missions, we had been able to rely exclusively on active forces, augmented by reserve volunteers.

Use of reserve volunteers has tended to work well for unit or individual missions that do not require close, intra-unit coordination (strategic airlift and some support missions, for example). It has been less effective in force elements such as ground combat units or ship crews, where unit training and cohesiveness is more important.

The ordering of reserve units to active duty provides enhanced military capabilities in a crisis and a demonstration of national will that can assist in deterring aggression.

A basic consideration in the construction of a force is the time assumed between mobilization and combat: the longer the warning time, the lower the required level of peacetime readiness. With the much longer warning times now being projected for a theater-wide European or major global conflict, we must weigh anew the required size and readiness of the forces we have required only for these threats. Some of these forces could be transferred to the reserves, manned at significantly reduced levels, or organized into cadre units. Some could be taken out of the force structure entirely as part of our reconstitution strategy. In implementing any of these approaches, we must preserve some of the long-lead-time equipment that exceeds current requirements, just as we seek to preserve trained leaders and other highly-trained personnel. Appropriate consideration must also be given to the difference between warning time and reaction time--firm decisions to act are not always made at the moment of first warning.

Not all missions are appropriate for the reserve components. Those that require a high surge of activity in wartime but comparatively low levels of activity in peacetime (air defense, for

example) are ideal for reservists. Missions requiring extended peacetime deployments (such as ballistic-missile submarine patrols), on the other hand, often are unsuitable for the reserves. Some missions can be assigned to either active or reserve units, depending on how soon the missions must be performed after a crisis develops, and the availability and readiness of individual units.

Peacetime missions that require intensive training, have highly technical military applications, require continuous presence, or demand high peacetime operating tempos or readiness are generally more appropriate for the active component. Many peacetime missions, however, can be performed by reserve units as part of their regular monthly training or annual active-duty tours.

Management Process

Choices about the size of the Total Force and the mix of active and reserve forces depend on the nature of current and potential threats to the nation, the military capabilities required to meet those threats, the ability of different types of forces to accomplish their wartime missions, the availability of defense resources, and our willingness to accept the greater or lesser risks associated with various levels of defense spending.

The evaluation of these and related factors, and the planning that is essential to achieve a desired force size and mix, requires a sound management process. The effectiveness of the Total Force Policy has in no small measure been the result of the existence of such a process in the Department of Defense. The management and command structures of the Department have provided unity of effort as missions and responsibilities of active and reserve components have been integrated into a cohesive whole. This unity has enabled each element of the Total Force to do what it does best in a manner that results in economy of personnel and materiel resources.

During the current period of transition in strategy and forces, the Department will retain the basic procedures that it uses to evaluate the force structure and make force-mix decisions. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) has served the Department well for over a quarter of a century, and DoD will continue to rely on this process in the years ahead. It has helped the Secretary of Defense allocate resources consistent with our readiness and sustainability goals for both active and reserve forces and plan for the use of these forces. The PPBS also provides a mechanism for conducting biennial reviews of the force structure and adjusting the force mix as necessary to meet changing resources and world situations. The PPBS provides a useful framework for

reviewing service program plans and for integrating the advice of the Secretary's senior civilian advisors with the military advice received from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other members of the Joint Chiefs, and field commanders.

II. THE WORK OF THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

Membership and Staff Support

The Total Force Policy study is being conducted by a group of 24 senior civilian and military officials appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) serve as chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the Study Group. The membership of the group is shown in the chart on the following page.

The Study Group is supported by a professional staff of 40 civilian analysts and military officers drawn from the organizations represented on the group. A member of the Senior Executive Service serves as Executive Director.

Formal Meetings

The Secretary of Defense signed the charter establishing the Total Force Policy Study Group on December 26, 1989. The Study

TOTAL FORCE POLICY STUDY GROUP

Chairman: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)

Vice Chairman: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)

Members:

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics)

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation)

Department of Defense General Counsel

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Environment)

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Resources)

Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board

Director, J-5 (Strategic Plans and Policy), representing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans), U.S. Army

Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division, U.S. Navy

Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs and Resources), U.S. Air Force

Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans, Policies, and Operations), U.S. Marine Corps

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for Reserve Affairs, U.S. Marine Corps

Chief, Army Reserve

Director, Naval Reserve

Chief, Air Force Reserve

Director, Army National Guard

Director, Air National Guard

Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, Coast Guard

Group held its first meeting on February 2, 1990, with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in attendance. Since then, the Study Group has met formally approximately two times per month. In these sessions, it has addressed topics such as:

- o Possible conflict scenarios and the forces and capabilities needed to respond to them;
- o Short-warning contingencies and their force and capability needs;
- o The advantages and disadvantages of alternative techniques for gaining the use of reserve forces for operational missions, including voluntary participation and use of the Presidential call-up authority;
- o Alternative methodologies to evaluate the relative costs of active and reserve forces;
- o Land, naval, and tactical air force requirements and capabilities;

- o Strategic mobility requirements and capabilities;
- o Manpower, personnel, and training policies; and
- o Medical manpower requirements.

Colloquia with Outside Experts

To obtain the insights and recommendations of outside experts and policymakers, the Study Group has hosted three colloquia. The first colloquium was held on April 10, 1990, and was attended by former senior military and civilian officials and representatives of important public or private policy groups, including:

- o A former Secretary of the Air Force;
- o A former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation);
- o A former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis);
- o A former director of the Joint Staff;
- o Two former chiefs of the National Guard Bureau;
- o Representatives of the Reserve Officers Association; and
- o The director of the Selective Service System.

At the first colloquium, the participants addressed topics such as the allocation of active and reserve missions, the use of section 673b call-up authority, resource allocation trends, and manpower efficiency.

The second colloquium, held on April 24, 1990, was devoted to Total Force issues of importance to the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the operational commands. The CINC or a senior representative from each of the following commands participated in that session:

- o Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM)
- o Central Command (USCENTCOM)
- o European Command (USEUCOM)
- o Forces Command (USFORSCOM)
- o North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
- o Pacific Command (USPACOM)
- o Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
- o Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

The third colloquium was conducted on April 30 and May 1, 1990. At this meeting, the Study Group was addressed by the Secretary of Defense.

A wide range of current and former federal officials participated in the session. They included:

- o The Honorable John McCain, United States Senator
- o The Honorable Herbert R. Bateman, Member of Congress
- o The Honorable Beverly B. Byron, Member of Congress
- o The Honorable William L. Dickinson, Member of Congress
- o The Honorable G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Member of Congress
- o Three former Members of Congress
- o The director of the Congressional Budget Office
- o Two former Secretaries of the Army
- o A former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
- o A former Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy
- o A former chairman of the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
- o The executive director of the Reserve Officers Association
- o A former U.S. Ambassador to NATO
- o Two Adjutants General

The discussion topics focused on national strategy, force structure and force mix issues, appropriate missions and roles for reserve

forces, the Presidential call-up authority, transfers of wartime missions to the reserves, resource allocation considerations, and public support issues.

Several outside experts who had been invited to attend the colloquia were unable to do so because of scheduling conflicts or other reasons. Consequently, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Study Group met individually with the following:

- o A former Commandant of the Marine Corps
- o A former chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board
- o Two Adjutants General--one the president of the Adjutants General Association of the United States and the other the president of the National Guard Association of the United States

Technical Conferences

The work of the Study Group has been supplemented by two technical conferences. The first conference focused on costing methodologies and related matters, and addressed various techniques for evaluating the comparative costs of active and reserve forces in the performance of specific missions. That conference also permitted

a discussion in some detail of the knotty definitional and data problems that hinder efforts to determine the transition, operating, and support costs associated with active and reserve units. The conference was attended by cost experts from each of the services. The second technical conference focused on key manpower, personnel, and training issues.

The Work of the Professional Staff

The professional staff of the Study Group has provided background information and research in support of the group's work. The staff has examined a wide array of questions, including:

- o Changes in the strategic environment and their implications for force structure and mix, including weighing the increased warning times available for some scenarios against the shorter times projected for others;
- o DoD and service directives regarding the Total Force Policy, to illustrate how the policy has evolved since its articulation in the 1970s and its current implications for resource and mission allocation;

- o The relative costs and capabilities of active and reserve units performing roughly the same missions;
- o How manpower, personnel, and training policies can encourage and benefit from flows of skilled personnel into the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve from the active component, and principles that could determine the relationship between peacetime manning levels and wartime requirements for active and reserve units;
- o Alternative force structures, to illustrate the implications of varying the force mix (including any cost savings made possible by heavier reliance on reserve forces, as well as the concomitant loss in immediate reaction capability and flexibility);
- o DoD policy on sizing the total medical force;
- o Strategies to train reservists (and mitigate problems associated with time constraints) and to gain employer support for such training;

- o The processes and criteria used by the military departments to make force-mix decisions; and
- o Other elements of the total force, including strategic forces, host nation support, civilian DoD employees, defense contractors, and military retirees.

III. TOTAL FORCE CONSIDERATIONS IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

The events triggered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have provided the first opportunity to observe a large-scale deployment of forces since the adoption of the Total Force Policy. Operation DESERT SHIELD offers new lessons and will provide new insights. While the deployment will not answer all questions on the appropriate composition of our forces, our understanding of a wide range of force structure questions undoubtedly will improve.

Iraqi troops crossed the border of Kuwait before dawn on August 2. One day later, Iraqi troops were reported near the border of Saudi Arabia. In response, two American aircraft carriers, the Independence and Eisenhower, were sent to the area. On August 6, Secretary Cheney met with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd. On August 7, the United Nations Security Council voted 13-0 (with two abstentions) to impose a sweeping ban on trade with Iraq. On August 8, the President announced that he had ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia.

The following description of contributions being made by different elements of the Total Force is more illustrative than complete. This section merely seeks to begin a discussion on how the Total Force has functioned in Operation DESERT SHIELD and to illustrate how elements of the Total Force--active forces, reserve forces, host nation support, DoD civilians, and defense contractors--have complemented each other in major, and often vital, ways.

Active Component

When the decision was made to deploy forces to Southwest Asia, the United States had only 10,000 personnel in the region, primarily assigned to naval forces. In the hope of deterring further aggression by Iraq, assets that could be moved quickly--a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and tactical air forces--were deployed. The 82nd quickly established a U.S. ground presence; the tactical fighters provided both air cover and antiarmor capabilities.

The active air units available in Southwest Asia soon included A-10s, F-15Es, F-16s, F-111s, and F-117s, as well as carrier-based naval air. By August 31, elements of nine active tactical fighter units were in Southwest Asia, along with E-3 airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) and RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft.

Apache (AH-64) attack helicopters also arrived early, providing, with the A-10s, a formidable antitank capability.

Among the first forces alerted were two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) that would be equipped and supplied from the maritime prepositioned ships located at Guam and Diego Garcia.

Active Army forces deployed after the 82nd Airborne Division included elements of five divisions, four brigades, two corps support commands, the U.S. Third Army Headquarters, a medical command, corps artillery units, a special forces group, and an armored cavalry regiment.

Additional naval forces also arrived shortly after the President's decision to deploy forces. A battleship battle group came into the Red Sea from the Mediterranean, and the battleship Wisconsin sailed from the East Coast. By the end of August, the aircraft carrier Kennedy and its battle group were in the Mediterranean to relieve the Eisenhower battle group. Also by this time, three MEBs were deployed in Southwest Asia, including nine amphibious ships carrying elements of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade. By August 31, twelve warships were operating in the Persian Gulf and seven (including the carrier Independence) were in the Gulf of Oman.

Additional ships, including the carrier Saratoga, were operating in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

The deployment of U.S. forces to the region has gone exceptionally well, and the level of multinational cooperation has been unprecedented. As a result, by the end of August, approximately 100,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines were in the region.

Reserve Component--Volunteer Phase

The use of reserve volunteers, especially by the Air Force to provide airlift and tanker support, was critical to the success of the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The following chart shows the number of volunteers supporting the deployment:

Reserve Component Volunteers Supporting Operation DESERT SHIELD:

August 8-31, 1990

	<u>Aug 8</u>	<u>Aug 15</u>	<u>Aug 22</u>	<u>Aug 27</u>	<u>Aug 31</u>
ARNG	5	68	107	109	109
USAR	0	200	392	448	685
USNR	0	26	183	264	264
USMCR	0	50	50	59	59
ANG	216	2,700	3,737	3,318	3,109
USAFR	350	4,500	5,992	5,907	3,810
USCGR	<u>24</u>	<u>131</u>	<u>197</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>253</u>
Total	595	7,675	10,658	10,298	8,289

The air reserve components responded quickly. By the time Secretary Cheney had met with King Fahd on August 6, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard had placed its strategic airlift and tanker unit volunteers into "pre-mission crew rest" status. Neither component encountered difficulties obtaining volunteer support. By 8:40 A.M. on August 7, the 459th Military Airlift Wing at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, had launched its first C-141 mission in support of DESERT SHIELD. By the end of the day, the unit had provided all seven of its available aircraft and eleven additional flight crews for strategic airlift missions. Reserve C-5 units from Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, and Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts, were also available on August 7, with a total of 14 of 31 assigned aircraft and 20 crews ready to fly.

Numerous other Air Force Reserve units also supported the deployment. As of August 31, over 14,500 reservists were available for participation in Operation DESERT SHIELD. Of these, 3,810 were on voluntary active-duty orders. Specialty skills represented by voluntary participants included operations and maintenance, medical, civil engineering, security police, and aerial port/mobile aerial port. During the period August 8-29, the Air Force Reserve flew 937 sorties (4,965 flying hours), carrying 9,091 passengers and 8,320 tons of cargo on C-5, C-141, C-130, and KC-135 aircraft. Additionally, 638

reserve personnel from 40 aerial port units supported the operation at 26 locations, while 749 reserve personnel from 12 maintenance units provided support at eight locations.

The Air National Guard responded in a similar way. After consulting with Military Airlift Command (MAC) headquarters, the Air National Guard Support Center polled its strategic airlift units in Jackson, Mississippi, and Stewart, New York, for available volunteers. By August 7, the 172nd Military Airlift Group in Jackson had provided six of its eight assigned C-141 aircraft and 14 augmentation crews. The 105th Military Airlift Group at Stewart, although in a conversion status, initially offered six C-5 aircraft and seven crews, and then added one more--for a total of seven of its nine available aircraft. Also, by August 7, the Air National Guard had provided 46 KC-135 tanker aircraft and crews to deploy to sites in CONUS and overseas. During the period August 8-28, the Air National Guard flew 365 KC-135 sorties, providing aerial refueling for more than 500 aircraft and moving 140 tons of cargo and 830 passengers. It deployed six RF-4, four EC-130, and four C-130 aircraft and associated personnel, and 11 communication units with 66 personnel, in support of DESERT SHIELD operations at seven locations. Ten Air National Guard aeromedical units operated at four locations, and ten mobile aerial port units were in operation at three

locations. Other augmentees included linguists, medical personnel, civil engineers, and firefighting personnel (both in CONUS and overseas), as well as command post personnel and combat communications specialists. The air reserve components also made a significant portion of their tactical airlift capacity available for CONUS operations in support of DESERT SHIELD.

The Army reserve components brought volunteers onto active duty to fill requirements identified by U.S. Forces Command (USFORSCOM) and other commands. In its review of force requirements for a large-scale deployment to Southwest Asia, the USFORSCOM staff identified an urgent need for water purification, supply, distribution, psychological operations, and civil affairs units--capabilities found primarily in the Army Reserve.

By August 20, a total of 286 Army Reserve volunteers were supporting the Military Traffic Management Command at ports, replacing professionals of the Health Services Command deployed to Southwest Asia, and assisting at Third Army Headquarters. (The latter group consisted of a five-member communications cell from the 228th Signal Brigade, South Carolina Army National Guard, which volunteered on August 8 and has remained on duty.) About two

dozen Army National Guard personnel have supported operations at Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart.

Almost from the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, Naval Reserve personnel have supported air operations, primarily flying passengers in C-9s. Other Naval Reservists have performed intelligence collection functions in support of CINCCENT. A total of 103 Naval Reserve personnel have supported port operations and provided staff support to headquarters, including those of the Military Sealift Command and the Middle East Task Force in Bahrain.

During the period August 8-31, the Marine Corps Reserve provided 59 volunteers for DESERT SHIELD. These were primarily civil affairs experts, along with a few linguists and Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) personnel. (Marine Corps policies do not require call-up of reserve forces for the initial commitment to a conflict unless two or more Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) are deployed.)

When it became clear that the U.S. response to the Iraqi invasion would involve the movement of forces and equipment by sea, 193 Coast Guard reservists volunteered to perform annual training and additional duty for training at various CONUS locations. These

activities, involving port security and the supervision of explosives loading and control of hazardous material, were initially concentrated at the ports of Savannah, Jacksonville, Wilmington, and Charleston. These personnel provided expertise and oversight that have facilitated the sealift of tons of material and equipment bound for the Middle East.

Reserve Component--Call to Active Duty of Units and Personnel

On August 22, 1990, pursuant to section 673b of Title 10 U.S.C., the President authorized the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to the Coast Guard) to order to active duty organized units and individual members of the Selected Reserve. The purpose of the call-up was to obtain the additional personnel needed to support active forces conducting operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula. The activities performed by reservists in Operation DESERT SHIELD have ranged from augmenting deployed active units to filling critical military support vacancies both in the United States and abroad.

On August 23, the Secretary of Defense delegated to the secretaries of the military departments authority to order up to 48,800 Selected Reservists to active duty. The Army was authorized

to call up 25,000 reservists to provide combat support and combat service support. A ceiling of 14,500 was established for the Air Force, while the Navy and Marine Corps were authorized to call up 6,300 and 3,000 reservists, respectively. This provided the initial authority the military departments needed to mobilize Selected Reserve units and members.

On August 25, the Army alerted 173 National Guard and Reserve units that could potentially be called to active duty prior to October 1, 1990. The following day, 16 Army National Guard and 34 Army Reserve units from 25 states were ordered to active duty. These elements included medical, linguist, maintenance, public affairs, administration, water distribution, terminal operations, and movement control units.

More than 200 Naval Reserve units from 37 states, the District of Columbia, and Germany have been involved in the Presidential call-up. As of September 10, approximately 3,700 Naval Selected Reservists had been called to active duty to support operations in the following mission areas: medical (2,340); cargo-handling (140); minesweeping (60); naval control of shipping (30); sealift (130); intelligence (170); logistics support (670); and helicopter combat support (15).

In addition to these involuntarily recalled personnel, 191 Selected Reservists from the Naval Reserves volunteered for duty and have been used to fill early, time-critical billets in intelligence, helicopter combat support, logistics support, naval control of shipping, and cargo-handling battalions. Initially, no Marine Corps Reserve units were ordered to active duty.

Three Air National Guard and three Air Force Reserve units from six states were called up on August 24. Five of the six were military airlift squadrons operating C-5A Galaxies and C-141B Starlifters; the remaining unit was a mobile aerial port squadron of airlift terminal and cargo managers.

In conjunction with the call-up by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation has proposed to call up 1,250 Coast Guard reservists. By August 31, 253 Coast Guard Reserve personnel had been called for three port security units, as well as for other support duties.

By August 31, almost 8,900 reservists had been called to active duty, and another 8,300 had volunteered to support DESERT SHIELD. These reservists were playing a critical role both in the theater of operations and in CONUS.

Host Nation Support/DoD Civilians/Defense Contractors

Because of the sensitivity of some countries and firms to the specific support being given to the United States during Operation DESERT SHIELD, the following discussion illustrates only briefly how the full Total Force Policy is being implemented in the Southwest Asian deployment.

Host nation support has been a key element in Operation DESERT SHIELD, as has support provided by contractors. Saudi Arabia has provided ports, bases, warehouses, and other facilities, as well as fuel, bulk water, some food, and ground transportation. Contractors and vendors have also helped with these services. Other nations in the region also are supporting U.S. forces.

In addition, Saudi Arabia and other countries have pledged substantial financial contributions for U.S. defense purposes, motivated by the need to meet the threat to our mutual security posed by the Iraqi aggression.

Civilian technicians and engineers are performing maintenance on aircraft, missiles, radars, tanks, and helicopters at regional locations, just as they do in the United States. The support they

have provided extends to facilities as well, including some of Saudi Arabia's airfields.

DoD has also used commercial aircraft to support operations in Southwest Asia through the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. Early in the operation, the Commander of the U.S. Military Transportation Command ordered the implementation of the first stage of the CRAF program, making 38 civilian aircraft, almost all wide-bodied, available to DoD for moving passengers and cargo.

IV. Conclusions

The ongoing work of the Study Group will continue to be considered by the Secretary of Defense in his evaluation of the budgets proposed by the military departments for FY 1992-93. The conclusions and recommendations that will be included in our final report to the Secretary will provide a basis for the challenging force structure and program decisions that the Department will make in the preparation of future budgets.